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Abstract
I have developed an informational interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics and dynamics, but in this 
paper I will concentrate on his theory of time. According to my interpretation, each monad is an 
incorporeal automaton programed by God, and likewise each organized group of monads is a 
cellular automaton (in von Neumann’s sense) governed by a single dominant monad (entelechy). 
The activities of these produce phenomena, which must be “coded appearances” of these activities; 
God determines this coding. A crucially important point here is that we have to distinguish the 
phenomena for a monad from its states (perceptions). Both are a kind of representation: a state 
represents the whole world of monads, and phenomena for a monad “result” from the activities of 
monads. But the coding for each must be different; R(W) for the first, Ph(W) for the second, where 
W is a state of the monadic world. The reason for this is that no monadic state is in space and time, 
but phenomena occur in space and time. Now, the basis of the phenomenal time must be in the 
timeless realm of monads. This basis is the order of state-transition of each monads. All the changes 
of these states are given at once by God, and these do not presuppose time. The coded appearances 
(which may well be different for different creatures) of this order occur in time (for any finite 
creatures), and its metric must depend on God’s coding for phenomena. For humans, in particular, 
this metric time is derived from spatial distance (metric space) via the laws of dynamics. Thus there 
may well be an interrelation between spatial and temporal metric. This means that the Leibnizian 
frame allows relativistic metric of space-time. I will show this after outlining Leibniz’s scenario.
1. Informational Interpretation of Monadology
When I first read Leibniz’s Monadology (1714) and related papers, I was struck by 
his characterization of monads as “incorporeal or spiritual automata.” A monad is, 
according to Leibniz, a simple substance with the primitive force, and this force 
governs its state-transition. What we usually regard as the “world” is phenomena 
produced by the activities of the monads. Many people may think that this whole idea 
is crazy, but as John Archibald Wheeler said, “crazy ideas are worth pursuing.” 
First, I should give a rough idea of what Monadology is all about. It is Leibniz’s 
almost final formulation of metaphysics. He forcefully argued that there must be 
simple substances (in reality) which support everything we see and feel in this world, 
the world of phenomena. The spheres of phenomena and of reality must be strictly 
separated. Physics or dynamics studies motions which are supposed to underlie 
phenomena, but the laws of dynamics must be grounded on metaphysical principles. 
In particular, space and time, which are usually assumed as a framework of dynamics 
must be explained from the metaphysical basis. In short, everything must be 
explained, ultimately, in terms of the activities of the monads. This is Leibniz’s grand 
vision. And this vision was described in more detail in Monadology.
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Each monad is a simple substance, a metaphysical point with no shape, no parts, no 
magnitude. But each monad must be different from each other, and this difference 
comes form its internal state, or more precisely, the whole series of states. But, as 
Leibniz repeats many times, each monad is a “living mirror” of the whole world, and 
each of its states is a “representation” of an instantaneous state of the whole world. 
Here, it is clear that representation needs coding, since something can be represented 
by another thing, only by coding. For example, the color red  is represented by the 
word “red” in English, but by the word “rouge” in French. Obviously, these two 
representations depend on two different codings. Likewise, when the reality (the 
world of monad) is somehow represented in phenomena, this representation needs 
another coding, since the two spheres, reality and phenomena, are completely 
different and their ontological status is radically different. See Figure 1 for a rough 
image.
These representations are, mathematically speaking, a mapping from one domain to 
another domain, by means of a function. Thus, we can express the representation in a 
monad by R(W), the representation in phenomena by Ph(W), where W is either the 
whole world or its relevant portion.This is my shorthand symbolism; if we are to 
distinguish different monads we need different subscripts for R and Ph. And what is 
unique in Leibniz is that W itself can be regarded as the totality of representations, 
R’s of all monads. In other words, this totality is nothing but the information of the 
world. In our modern terms, Leibniz’s metaphysics is not only informational, but full 
of recursion of this sort.
Figure 1. Reality and Phenomena
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PHENOMENA (Appearance resulting from REALITY)
Now, since I wish to concentrate on the problem of time, let me briefly summarize 
basic features of my Informational Interpretation of Monadology (the ground of this 
interpretation is explained in Uchii 2009, 2014a, b, and c). Some features relevant to 
Leibniz’s theory of time will be discussed in more detail later.
(1) All monads are created by God, as the ultimate programmer.
(2) The world of monads is governed by the Pre-established harmony.
(3) The world of monads is without space, and without time.
(4) Each monad changes its state (perception) according to its own distinctive 
transition function (according to my interpretation), and the whole sequence of 
its states is given at once (Uchii 2014a, sect. 1).
(5) The unity or individuality of each monad is defined by its sequence of states (in 
other words, by its initial state and its transition function and both are given by 
God).
(6) Monads are organized into many groups, each of which is governed by a single 
dominant monad, called anima or entelechy. And such groups are again 
organized into a nested structure, ad infinitum. The whole is a single world, 
ultimately governed by God (Uchii 2014a, sect. 12).
(7) There are many invariant structures in the world of monads. Most important is 
that the information is conserved, and for each monad, the order of state-
transition does not change. As a consequence, the order of world-states does not 
change either, where a “world-state” is a conjunction of all instantaneous states, 
aligned by one-to-one correspondence, of monads (Uchii 2014b, sects. 20, 21).
(8) The activities (i.e., state-transitions) of these monads produce phenomena 
(appearances) for each monad, as was already explained. The genesis of 
phenomena, which may well be different depending on the grade of monad, 
depends on God’s coding. That is, the same world state W may well appear 
differently to humans and to angels, for instance. 
(9) Further, notice that the quantitative features of phenomena, including the 
magnitude of space and time (in other words, length and duration) must be 
generated by God’s coding of Ph, by preserving the invariant structures of the 
monadic world. According to my interpretation, no other elements of 
Monadology can be responsible for this job (NB: a monad has no magnitude).
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2. From Information to Energy
Now we begin to see more details. First, feature (7): I understand that all monads 
are created by God at once, and each monad is given a unique transition function, 
together with its initial state. This means that the sequence of states of each monad is 
given at once. And this further implies that the information characterizing each 
monad does not change, unless God annihilate it. Thus it is clear that this 
information is conserved, and hence the information of the whole world of monads 
is also conserved.
Now, let us recall that Leibniz repeatedly says that each monad is given the 
primitive force (active and passive), and this is the source of each monad’s activities. 
And the primitive force appears, in the phenomenal world, as the derivative force, 
and this governs the activities of bodies in the phenomena. Further, within 
Leibniz’s dynamics, one of the most important laws is the conservation of vis viva, 
energy in modern terms. We can see that this is a rather direct consequence from the 
conservation of information in the monadic world. For, the primitive force is 
another name for the principle regulating the state-transition of each monad, and 
what I called “transition function” of a monad is just a modern expression for 
saying the same thing. And Leibniz’s intention seems clear: the conservation of 
energy is grounded by the conservation of information in reality, in the world of 
monads.
Table 1. Four Kinds of Force
3. Space and Analysis Situs
But our main concern is time. Time does not exist in the monadic world. Then, how 
can time be generated in the phenomenal world? Of course, another, exactly similar 
question arises as regards space too. And my interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of 
time is that he moved from space to time by mediation of motion.  So let me briefly 
touch upon the problem of space and geometry.  This problem has been masterfully 
treated by Vincenzo De Risi (2007). Leibniz's work on Analysis Situs (analysis of 
situations) deals with this question, as De Risi has convincingly argued. In a 
nutshell, bodies coexisting in the phenomenal world are situated, or related with 
FORCE Primitive (in monad) 
[informational]
Derivative (in phenomena) 
[dynamical]
Active (form) controlled by transition 
function, and produces the 
whole sequence of states
motion
Passive (primary matter) resistance and impenetrability
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each other, and this situation is the phenomenal expression of the groups of 
monads corresponding to them. Thus space results, as a totality of such relations. 
Or more precisely, space in general can be defined by considering all possible 
situations, and the actual space can be defined in terms of the actual situation of the 
world. Informally speaking, situations are geometrical and metrical relations based 
on the basic notion of congruence, but metric itself is arbitrary in Analysis Situs; so 
that Analysis Situs can characterize, in qualitative terms, space and spatial relations.
Now, I have to mention that Leibniz had some difficulty for defining straight line in 
terms of Analysis Situs. The source of the difficulty is the gap between “the shortest 
path” and the “straight line” connecting two points. Leibniz often tries to identify 
these two. But we, thanks to our hindsight, can see that these two are identical only 
in Euclidean geometry; the shortest path is now called geodesic, and it can be curved. 
As we will see shortly, this difficulty affects Leibniz’s dynamics too, because inertial 
motion is always taken to be straight and uniform, and moreover, straight motion is 
given a special status in Leibniz’s dynamics.　
We will ignore these problems for a while, and move on to the problem of time.
4. Motion as a Change of Situation
The crucial question for us is: Given a theory of space, how can we move on to a 
theory of time? Leibniz is of course well aware of the essential difference between 
space and time. He frequently puts it this way: “space is the order of coexisting 
possibles, time is the order of inconsistent possibles” (in a letter to de Volder), or 
“space is the order of coexistences, time is the order of successions.” Here we have 
to be careful. Space and time are needed only in phenomena; the reality itself has no 
need for them. But at least some features of reality must be reflected in phenomena 
so that our mind can know them.
Now, the notion of coexistence presupposes simultaneity, and two states of affairs, 
which are incompatible at the same moment, may well occur in different moments. 
Thus, many different states of affairs can occur through time. And notice that this 
feature is similar in reality and in phenomena as well. Thus, Leibniz is saying, in 
effect, that a change of state is closely connected with the notions of order and time. 
First, any monad’s activity is nothing but a sequence of states, a sequence of 
perceptions. Such a sequence has definitely an order, and this order is uniquely 
determined by a transition function. Thus we can clearly see that this is the basis for 
time in the phenomena. Further, in Initia Rerum Mathematicarum Metaphysica (1714) 
[Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics], he defines motion as a change of 
situation. Here he is talking about phenomena, and hence we need time. And it is 
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clear that dynamics is concerned with situational changes among the bodies in 
phenomena. This suggests that spatial geometry can be connected with time by 
means of motion. But Leibniz begins this paper with a few definitions of temporal 
concepts, and his definition of motion comes later. So let us see them.
5. Simultaneity and Temporal Order
The temporal concepts defined are “simultaneous,” “prior,” and “posterior.” And the 
reader may be easily misled to assume that Leibniz is discussing only the temporal 
concepts in phenomena. But wait a second! The title of the paper refers to the 
“metaphysical foundations.” Then Leibniz must be talking about reality also. Thus 
I understand that he is trying to point out the connection between these temporal 
concepts and their counterparts in reality, the world of monads. This conjecture has 
a strong ground, because Leibniz always assumes homomorphisms (partial 
isomorphism) between reality and phenomena. When he says that certain features 
of reality is expressed in phenomena (e.g., bodies and their motions), he is speaking 
on this assumption. Likewise, when I am talking about coding, I am also speaking 
on the same assumption. Any coded message must preserve some essential content 
or structure of the original information; otherwise, it should be useless. And if we 
keep this in mind, Leibniz’s definition, and discussion of those temporal concepts 
should be interpreted in two, interconnected ways, namely, the basis of time in 
reality, and temporal relations in phenomena. I named this, Double Interpretation.
I will refrain from getting into textual analyses, since it would take much time, and 
it may be boring to philosophers of science (see Uchii 2014b). However, the 
following crucial statement must not be ignored, since my interpretation hinges on 
it.
My earlier state involves a reason for the existence of my later state. And 
since my prior state, by reason of the connection between all things, involves 
the prior state of other things as well, it also involves a reason for the later 
state of these other things and is thus prior to them. (Loemker 1969, 666)
The assertion that everything is connected is one of the distinctive features of 
Leibniz’s philosophy. But, here, this assertion is specifically applied to the problem 
of simultaneity and temporal order. And we can clearly see that Leibniz is alluding 
to a homomorphism or correspondence between the state-transition of a monad 
and the temporal order in the phenomena. Moreover, he is clearly assuming an 
alignment of the states of the world, both monadic and phenomenal. My 
interpretation is simple: given all monads and their state-transitions, their 
instantaneous states are aligned, across all monads, according to the order of these 
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states; in other words, these aligned states are connected by this one-to-one 
correspondence, and this is the basis of temporal simultaneity. 
Notice that the initial states of monads are given by God when He created them; so 
that there is no difficulty for the alignment of the initial states, nor for the 
subsequent order and alignment. See Table 2, for a simplified toy-model (see also, 
my explanation below the Table).
Table 2. Monadic States are aligned
I have to emphasize that the notion of simultaneity should be understood as a 
temporal concept (for describing phenomena), and the alignment in the Table 2 must 
not be called a relation of simultaneity. The alignment is a mere one-to-one 
correspondence with no temporal implication; but it is the basis for producing time 
in phenomena. Thus, any temporal order in the phenomena must preserve the 
structure of this alignment, although, the temporal order contains metric, in 
addition. 
In order to avoid a misunderstanding, I have to add the following important 
remark: corresponding to the “infinite divisibility of matter and space,” any finite 
time interval should be infinitely divisible. This implies that the model of the Table 2 
is a toy-model. Between s(1,1) and s(1,2), for instance, an infinity of states should 
recur. Leibniz suggests this in his reply to Clarke (see Fifth paper, sect. 105.) Thus, 
in order to generalize the idea of Table 2, we have to use a real number (say, in the 
interval [0,1), the right-hand side open) for signifying the order. For any two order 
numbers q, r (q<r), they show an order only, not quantity. (Metric must preserve the 
order, but order does not imply quantity, which comes from another source.) After 
all, if a monad is to reflect the whole world in its own way, its sequence of states 
should be as rich and complex as the whole world!
On this assumption, given all monads and their sequence of states, an alignment of 
states can have, generally, various possibilities, provided  that alignment does not 
disturb the original order. Such alignments can be easily obtained, because one-to-
MONADS STATES (second digits are their ORDER)
monad 1 s(1,1) s(1,2) s(1,3) . . . . . .
monad 2 s(2,1) s(2,2) s(2,3) . . . . . .
monad 3 s(3,1) s(3,2) s(3,3) . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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one correspondences between two or more continua are quite flexible. And one 
thing is certain. Leibniz has to assume such an alignment; otherwise there should 
be no real basis for time.
Figure 2. Alignment of States and Order between two Continua
6. How to connect Space and Time?
We now come to the crucial part. Starting from the basis of time in reality, how can 
Leibniz obtain metric time in the phenomena? We have to employ laws of 
dynamics, but without getting involved in circular reasoning. Because, laws of 
dynamics are ultimately grounded on metaphysical basis, and the latter does not 
presuppose time. I will argue that “timeless order” of state-transition can be 
projected, so to speak, to the phenomenal world, via coding, and it is this coding 
that produces metric time. I will also argue that both classical time and relativistic 
time can be reconstructed, depending on coding. This amazing possibility stems 
from the timeless nature of reality (monads). Moreover, since coding of phenomena 
may well be different for higher or lower grades of monads and of organized 
groups of monads, even multi-metric dynamics can be possible.
Although Leibniz did not discuss, systematically, how we humans should 
determine the metric of time, he described at least an outline of the relation of space 
and time in Initia Rerum. De Risi, after discussing how Analysis Situs contributed to 
the philosophy of space and geometry, criticized Leibniz’s treatment of time. He 
argues that Leibniz’s did not clarify the foundation of time. I do not think so. 
De Risi’s fine analysis of Leibniz’s view on space and geometry is quite valuable: 
the metric of space, according to Leibniz, can be determined if we can have a 
suitable criterion for congruence of distance. In modern terms, if we have a rigid rod, 
and can assume the rod does not change its length through any motions 
(translation, rotation, etc.), the distance between any two points can be determined, 
so that the length of rod can determine the spatial metric. Any repeated use of the 
rod implies counting the number of unit lengths between the two points. However, 
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since Analysis Situs applies only to coexisting bodies, the notion of spatial 
congruence cannot be applied to time, De Risi argues, because a situation cannot 
hold among successive states (or situations) of bodies. He is right, so far.
But Leibniz, in Initia Rerum, dwells on the analogy between space and time. And 
the crucial point emerges when he defines a path of a movable thing.
A path [via] is the continuous and successive locus of a movable thing. (Initia 
Rerum, Loemker 1969, 668)
Many Leibniz scholars may quickly point out that Leibniz denies the existence of  a 
motion, because, at any instant, a body in motion can have its place (locus), but its 
past states and future states cannot coexist with its present state. Yes, indeed Leibniz 
himself emphasizes this in Specimen Dynamicum (1695). But in the definition of path, 
he is not saying that a motion exists; he is merely saying that a path, a spatial entity, 
can exist. If you draw a line on a blackboard, that line is a path, and all parts of that 
line exist simultaneously. Although your motion of drawing does not exist 
anymore, its path exists on the blackboard. This is the crucial connection of time and 
space, via motion.
Further, Leibniz adds the following careful remark:
But we know as coexisting, not merely those things we perceive together, but 
also those which we perceive successively, provided only that, during the 
transition of from the perception of one to the other, the former is not 
destroyed and the latter generated. (Loemker 1969, 671, my italics.)
In terms of our example of the path on the blackboard, Leibniz’s point is clear. If the 
line you have drawn is long, we take time for seeing the whole path by successive 
perceptions. Suppose our perception, beginning with the left end, finishes at the 
right end of the line. Then, we are sure that the left end exists now when we come to 
the right end, and we are also sure that, when we started perception, the right end, 
as well as the left end, existed then. The motion of your chalk may be regarded as, 
being represented in the line on the blackboard, although the motion itself does not 
exist now. Then, it is clear that the metric of time (of your motion) is somehow 
connected with the length of the line.
7. Inertial Motion
But we still cannot recognize the metric of time by the length of line alone. We need 
some standard for defining the unit of time. In the case of spatial metric, the notion 
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of congruence played a crucial role, and this suggests that we need the notion of 
congruence for time interval also. Is there any motion which can be used for this 
purpose? We may immediately suggest that inertial motions can be useful in this 
context. An inertial motion (in classical physics) is straight and uniform. Then, if we 
can measure the length L of a finite portion of the path of an inertial motion, this 
may serve as a criterion of temporal congruence. By comparing L with the length of 
any portion P of the path of another motion, we can know the ratio of P/L, which 
can show the ratio of time that motion took, compared to the inertial motion. For 
instance, Galileo’s research on a projectile may be recalled; this is a beautiful 
example of “measuring a change by a steady change.”
In the following Figure, inertial motion can be used as a “clock” (a unit length is 
repeated uniformly), and an accelerated motion of free fall changes its speed. The 
speed as well as time can be measured in terms of the unit length of inertial motion. 
Figure 3.  Galileo’s Projectile
However, this method for introducing time is question-begging, since the 
uniformity of inertial motion is presupposed. The “uniformity” is nothing but the 
uniformity of speed, which presupposes the concept of time already.
8. Inertial Systems are interesting enough
The problem seems to boil down to the foundations of the law of inertia; thus we 
have to get into metaphysics. I am now working on a possible reconstruction of the 
Leibnizian foundations of the law of inertia (generalization, and taking gravity into 
consideration too), and in this paper, I cannot get into this problem. For, despite the 
absence of the justification of the law of inertia in Leibniz, we can find several 
important features of his theory of time, based on the law of inertia. So, let us start 
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from this law. In modern terminology, we restrict our attention only to inertial 
systems. After all, the so-called “Newtonian mechanics” can be used for inertial 
systems, and this circumstance seems to be the same with Leibniz’s dynamics.
Thus we take it for granted that any inertial motions have a uniform speed. Then, 
any inertial motion can be used as a “clock” for defining the congruence of time 
intervals. The reason is quite similar to the case of Galileo’s projectile; any finite 
portion of the path of an inertial motion can give a unit length, and because of the 
constancy of the uniformity of inertial motion, the chosen length of may be 
regarded as representing a unit length of duration. Further, by comparing inertial 
motions with different speed, this unit can be divided into any smaller length, so 
that the situation is exactly similar to the spatial length. And once we establish the 
criterion of temporal congruence, we can extend it to periodic phenomena, such as 
the revolution of the earth or the motion of a pendulum, or the vibration of a 
spring, etc.
So far, you may think there is nothing new. But notice that Leibniz can reduce the 
congruence of time to that of space. This means he does not need absolute time, like 
Newton. Moreover, space and time are connected, as he is saying “everything is 
connected in the world.”
9. From Inertial Systems to Relativity
Since we are concerned with inertial systems, spatial distance can be measured by a 
straight line, and the geometry of space is Euclidean. But what about time? Here, a 
novelty appears, because of the connection between space and time. The metric of 
time is dependent on spatial metric, but there is no need for it to be symmetric with 
it. Of course, if it is symmetric, Leibniz’s dynamics may be, in effect, equivalent 
with Newtonian mechanics. But, since the coding for phenomena comes in for 
determining temporal metric, some interesting thing can happen. It is possible that 
the mutual dependence of spatial and temporal metric is such that the resulting 
metric is the Lorentz metric of special relativity. Leibniz knew, in all probability, that 
the speed of light is finite, because both Newton and Huygens knew Ole Rømer’s 
discovery. Moreover, his insistence on plenum may impose a limitation for the 
propagation of information in the phenomenal world. We know because of our 
hindsight that relativity together with the constancy of the speed of light lead to the 
Lorentz metric. I am now saying that Leibniz entertained such possibilities; of 
course not! I am rather saying that it is worthwhile to explore the potentialities of 
the Leibnizian dynamics. And I claim that his dynamics had enough flexibilities to 
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adapt itself to special relativity. This flexibility is out of question for Newtonian 
mechanics, since it assumed absolute space and time.
Notice that it is perfectly all right, for Leibniz, to have dynamics of special relativity, 
with no modifications whatsoever in his metaphysics. The invariant structure of 
information is intact. Only by changing coding from reality to phenomena, the same 
invariant structure can produce either classical or relativistic physics.
10. Leibniz’s Demon
Let me end this paper with one more amazing example. Do you know Leibniz’s 
Demon? It appears in section 61 of Monadology:
every body is affected by everything that happens in the universe, to such 
an extent that he who sees all can read in each thing what happens 
everywhere, and even what has happened or what will happen, by 
observing in the present what is remote in time as well as in space. (Ariew 
and Garber 1989, 221)
Most modern readers familiar with relativity theories may argue against this, by 
saying that this demon is against our best theories! On the one hand, Leibniz seems 
to have a good reason to assert the possibility of this demon. For, in the world of 
monads (reality), everything is given at once, as timeless entities and series of 
states. On the other hand, it seems that Leibniz is talking about this possibility in 
the phenomenal world; then this possibility seems to be excluded by relativity. Now I 
think Leibniz must have had a theory of time that can solve this problem.
According to my Informational Interpretation, space-time metric must be generated 
by coding for phenomena. And this coding may well be different for different 
monads, especially if there are different grades of monads, such as humans and 
angels. Then, because of this difference of coding, the speed of light can be 
different: much faster for angels, slower for humans (see Figure 4). And again, this 
is possible without changing anything in reality. Leibniz’s dynamics has this much of 
flexibility and potentiality.
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Figure 4. Bi-metric Relativity  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